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(August 29, 2003) 
 
MANDAMUS - CERTIORARI – MECHANIC’S LIENS 
 
Summary 
 
General contractor’s petition for writ of mandamus or certiorari against partial summary 
judgment granted by the First Judicial District Court, State of Nevada, dismissing mechanic’s lien 
against property owner.   
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
Petition for writ of mandamus or certiorari denied.  Petitioner did not demonstrate the district 
court engaged in extra-jurisdictional acts or manifest abuse of discretion warranting such 
extraordinary relief. 
  
Factual and Procedural History 
 
In May 1999, the Petitioner, Dayside Inc., (Dayside) and the real party in interest, Parkway 
Manor, Inc. (Parkway), executed a preprinted form contract requiring Dayside to construct an 
apartment building on Parkway’s real property for $9,165,226 in monthly installments.  The parties 
agreed, among other things, that Dayside would “not file a mechanic’s or materialman’s lien against 
Parkway…on account of any work done, labor performed or materials furnished under this 
Contract….”  The parties expressly crossed out language imposing the waiver on subcontractors and 
further wrote Dayside’s waiver of lien rights was valid “to the extent such waiver is in accordance 
with Nevada law.”  
Despite the lien-waiver provision, Dayside recorded a mechanic’s lien against Parkway and 
joined a subcontractor already in litigation against Parkway after Parkway’s failure to pay “large 
sums of money owed.”  Dayside pled various contractual and tort claims against Parkway, including 
foreclosure of the mechanic’s lien.  Dayside alleged, among other things, such a waiver is void as 
against public policy; there was insufficient consideration in support of the waiver; Parkway’s 
nonpayment constituted a failure of consideration; and the waiver was entered involuntarily. 
In June 2002, District Court Judge William Maddox granted partial summary judgment for 
Parkway against Dayside and dismissed the lien, ruling the contract’s express lien-waiver provision 
was clear and not contrary to Nevada law. 
In December 2002, Dayside challenged the partial summary judgment and dismissal by 
petitioning the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or certiorari. Nevada Supreme Court 
Justices Robert Rose, Mark Gibbons, and William Maupin, in a per curiam decision, denied the 
petition as the contractual waiver provisions did not violate public policy and the district court did not 
abuse its discretion. 
 
Discussion 
 
Writs of mandamus are available to compel the performance of an act arising from a duty 
required by law of an office, trust, or station, or to remedy a manifest abuse of discretion.1  Writs of 
certiorari serve to remedy jurisdictional/judicial excesses by an inferior tribunal.2  Both are 
                                                     
1 See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.160; see also Round Hill Gen. Imp. Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 637 P.2d 534 (1981). 
2 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.020(2). 
extraordinary remedies and generally unavailable if the petitioner has adequate legal remedy 
available.3  Despite the availability of Dayside to appeal any final judgment, including the partial 
summary judgment, because this petition raises an issue of first impression on an important issue of 
law and public policy (the waiver of statutory protections for materialmen and laborers), the court 
shall exercise its discretion and invoke its original jurisdiction to consider issuing a writ of mandamus 
or certiorari to clarify the law and better serve public policy.4  
Nevada’s legislative enactments are silent as to whether waivers of statutory rights to 
mechanic’s liens are against public policy.5  It is well settled in some states that clear and 
unambiguous contractual waivers of rights to mechanic’s liens are valid and binding.6  Some state 
legislatures have declared a lien waiver as against public policy,7 whereas other states expressly 
permit such waivers.8  The Nevada Supreme Court found that, absent a prohibitive legislative 
proclamation, waivers of mechanic’s lien rights are not contrary to public policy.   
As to Dayside’s failure of consideration argument, the court held that Parkway’s failure to 
pay had no effect on the lien-waiver provision.  Once waived, the contractor is limited to normal 
common-law remedies such as breach of contract for failure to pay.9 Inadequate payment is an event 
anticipated by the contract, rather than a failure of consideration.  
The court rejected Dayside’s contention that there was inadequate consideration to support 
the waiver clause in the first place.  The court determined the mutual promises and negotiations of 
Dayside to build and Parkway to pay for the construction were sufficient consideration in support of 
the contract10 and the waiver provision was a bargained for part of that contract.11  
The court did not reach to Dayside’s contention the lien rights were waived involuntarily 
because the risks were “unknown, unquantified and…potentially the price of the entire job.”  Because 
Dayside did not make this argument to the district court, the Supreme Court had no evidentiary record 
to determine whether the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Dayside did not demonstrate the extraordinary relief requested is warranted.  The district 
court did not engage in an extra-jurisdictional act or a manifest abuse of its discretion in granting 
summary judgment dismissing the lien.  Accordingly, Dayside’s petition for a writ of mandamus or 
certiorari is denied.    
                                                     
3 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.020(2); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.170; State v. Dist. Ct. (Ducharm), 118 Nev. ----, ----, 55 P.3d 420, 423 (2002) 
(mandamus); Dangberg Holdings v. Douglas Co., 115 Nev. 129, 137-38, 978 P.2d 311, 316 (1999) (certiorari);  Karow v. Mitchell, 110 
Nev. 959, 962, 878 P.2d 978, 981 (1994) (denying a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition because the petitioner had taken an 
appeal from the challenged order).   
4 See Diaz v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 88, 93, 993 P.2d 50, 54 (2000). 
5 See Senate Bill (SB) 206, § 26, 72d  Leg. (Nev. 2003).  SB 206, enacted June 10, 2003, strictly circumscribes attempts to waive or impair 
the lien rights of a contractor, subcontractor or supplier, but is applicable only to agreements consummated on or after October 1, 2003.    
6 J.A. Bock, Annotation, Validity and Effect of Provision in Contract Against Mechanic's Lien, 76 A.L.R.2d 1087, 1089 (1961); see, e.g., 
Durant Const., Inc. v. Gourley, 125 Mich.App. 695, 336 N.W.2d 856 (1983); see also Landvatter Ready Mix, Inc. v. Buckey, 963 S.W.2d 
298, 301 (Mo.Ct.App.1997)(recognizing that "[i]t has long been the rule that a mechanic's lien claim may be waived…"). 
7 See, e.g., 770 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 60/1.1 (West 2001) ("An agreement to waive any right to enforce or claim any lien under this 
Act…either express or implied…is against public policy and unenforceable."). 
8 See, e.g., 49 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. §  1401 (West 2001) ("A contractor or subcontractor may waive his right to file a claim by a written 
instrument…or by any conduct which operates equitably to estop such contractor or subcontractor from filing a claim."). 
9 Pero Bldg. Co., Inc. v. Smith, 6 Conn.App. 180, 504 A.2d 524, 527 (1986);  see also 56 C.J.S. Mechanic's Liens §  252, at 288 (1992) 
("When a contractor waives his right to a lien, he agrees not to rely on the statutory remedy, but to rely only on his common-law remedies 
against the owner of the property."). 
10 See Pink v. Busch, 100 Nev. 684, 688, 691 P.2d 456, 459 (1984). 
11See G.R. Sponaugle & Sons, Inc. v. McKnight Const. Co., 304 A.2d 339, 344 (Del.Super.Ct.1973)(observing that the consideration 
underlying a provision waiving lien rights in a construction contract is the same consideration supporting the entire contract.); Torres v. 
Meyer Paving Co., 423 N.E.2d 692, 696 (Ind.Ct.App.1981)(finding a no-lien agreement supported by the consideration underlying the 
parties' contemporaneous construction contract). 
 
